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LEARNING FROM LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES 
Clayton Littlejohn 
King's College London 
 
What can we learn from cases of knowledge from 
falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have 
argued that these cases provide us with good reason for 
rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, 
and the norm of belief.  I shall offer a limited defense of the 
knowledge-first approach to these matters.  Knowledge 
from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in 
like-from-like reasoning in epistemology.  Just as we 
should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from 
non-knowledge, we should be open to the idea that justified 
beliefs can come from unjustified beliefs.  
 
Philosophers have long had a soft spot for like-from-like reasoning. Whatever 
produces a good person must be good. Whenever something is heated it is heated by 
something hot. The degree of perfection contained in the effect cannot exceed the 
degree contained in the cause. And so on.  We know that there is an intuition that 
underlies transmission theories of causation, but we also know that the intuition is 
unreliable. Gin is colourless but it makes you see rainbows. Populations can become 
increasingly fit over time. And so on.  If we were surprised to discover that 
knowledge can come from mistaken belief, maybe we shouldn't have been.  Without 
some specific reason for thinking that only knowledge can beget knowledge, we 
should have been open to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood (KFF).  
 In KFF cases, a subject acquires knowledge by reasoning through a falsehood.   
Most of the literature on knowledge from falsehood is concerned with the possibility 
of KFF cases.1  Some of it focuses on the significance of such cases.2  This is a paper 
about the significance of the possibility.3  For various reasons, people think that KFF 
cases cause trouble for the knowledge-first approach to evidence, justification, and the 
norm of belief.  These arguments all seem to assume that certain like-from-like 
reasoning fails for knowledge but holds for justification. I think this is a mistake. If 
it's unreliable for knowledge, it's unreliable for justification.4 
 One kind of like-from-like reasoning in epistemology is reasoning that 
assumes that knowledge is counter-closed:      
K-Counter-Closure (KCC): Necessarily, if (i) S knows that 
p entails q and (ii) S comes to believe q solely on the basis 
                                                        
1  See Coffman (2008), Fitelson (2010), Klein (2008), and Warfield (2005) for 
defenses of the possibility. See Schnee (2015) for skepticism. 
2 See Arnold (2013), Littlejohn (2013), and Luzzi (2010). 
3  Comesana and Kantin (2010) and Rizzieri (2011) use cases of reasoning from 
falsehoods to try to cause trouble for E=K. Their arguments rest on assumptions 
similar to those at play in this paper, but they do not depend upon the intuitions that 
suggest that KFF is possible.     
4  I discovered that Murphy (forthcoming) is also critical of this idea. To my 
knowledge, he is the first person to argue in print that unjustified beliefs can serve as 
the basis for some inferentially justified beliefs.   
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of competently deducing it from p, and (iii) S knows q, 
then S knows p (Luzzi 2010).5 
Luzzi has argued rather persuasively that we can use KFF cases to show that KCC is 
mistaken. Let's take this as our starting point. Using these cases, some epistemologists 
have argued that the cases that undermine KCC also undermine various claims 
associated with the knowledge-first movement.  They have been taken to show that 
knowledge isn't evidence, it isn't justified belief, and it isn't the norm of belief:   
E=K One’s evidence includes p iff one knows p (Hyman 
2006, Williamson 2000). 
KN: One shouldn't believe p unless one knows p 
(Littlejohn, 2013, Williamson 2000, Sutton 2007). 
J=K: One’s belief about p is justified iff one knows p 
(Sutton 2007).6 
The basic argumentative strategy is something like this. In the KFF cases we will 
have a pair of beliefs, one that is false and one that constitutes knowledge. The latter 
will be inferred from the former. For the former to give rise to knowledge, it would 
have to have something going for it. It would have to be justified, have to provide 
evidence, and have to conform to the norms governing belief. Since, however, the 
belief doesn't constitute knowledge, E=K, J=K, and KN all must be mistaken. 
 The strategy only works on the assumption that justification is counter-closed:  
J-Counter-Closure (JCC): Necessarily, if (i) S knows that p 
entails q and (ii) S comes to justifiably q solely on the basis 
of competently deducing it from p, and (iii) S justifiably 
believes q, then S justifiably believes p.    
As we will see below, the cases that cause trouble for KCC also cause trouble for 
JCC.  If, as I shall argue below, the KFF cases give us no (new) reason to question 
E=K, J=K, or KN, the KFF cases are really trouble for JCC. I shall discuss the 
significance of this below.7    
  
1.  
Let’s consider some representative cases from KFF literature.  Three should suffice:  
                                                        
5 Reasoning from a false premise is not the same thing as reasoning from a false 
reason. See Alvarez (2010) and Hyman (2011) for discussion of the difference. 
6 In Littlejohn (2012), I argued that doxastic justification should be understood in 
terms of Sosa’s (2007) notion of aptness. Sosa identifies apt belief with knowledge 
(of a kind). Although he thought that apt beliefs didn’t necessarily constitute 
knowledge, he’s changed course.  Williamson has also changed course. In his (2000), 
he allowed that it might be possible to justifiably believe what you don’t know, but he 
has since embraced the view that it’s impossible to justifiably believe what you don’t 
know on the grounds that it’s impossible to justifiably believe a proposition whilst 
violating the fundamental norm of belief.  See his (2013) for discussion. He allows 
that there is a sense of ‘justification’ that is distinct from knowledge, but suggests that 
this sense really captures the notion of an excuse. 
7 There are, of course, familiar objections to E=K and J=K.  See Coffman (2010) and 
Kelp (2011), for example.  There have also been responses to these criticisms to 
consider. See Littlejohn (2012), Mitova (forthcoming), and Williamson (2013), for 
example.  I don't want to defend E=K or J=K here. My aim is simply to argue that 
these cases don't give us any additional reason to think that these theses are mistaken. 
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Father Christmas: Virginia’s parents tell her that Father 
Christmas will put presents under the tree for her. Believing 
what her parents tell her, she infers that there will be presents 
waiting for her tomorrow under the tree. She knows that there 
will be presents (Klein 2008). 
 
Meeting Time: Alex has a 7 pm meeting, and extreme (and 
justified) confidence in my fancy watch’s perfect accuracy. 
Alex makes inferences from what his watch says only if he 
has extreme confidence that it is perfectly accurate (perhaps 
he has exacting standards for what constitutes a good watch). 
Having lost track of the time and wanting to arrive on time 
for the meeting, Alex looks carefully at his watch. Because of 
his extreme confidence in his watch’s accuracy, he reasons: 
‘It’s exactly 2:58 pm; therefore I am not late for my 7 pm 
meeting’. Again he knows his conclusion, but as it happens 
it’s exactly 2:56 pm, not 2:58 pm (Warfield 2005; Arnold 
2013). 
 
Millikan’s Experiment: By measuring the electrical charges 
of many oil drops, Millikan determined both the value of e 
(i.e., the charge of the electron), and that the charges are all 
integer multiples of e. Determining a relatively exact value of 
e involved measuring the following parameters as accurately 
as possible: temperature, pressure, voltage, the coefficient of 
viscosity of air, the density of clock oil, the value of the 
gravitational constant and the times of rise and fall of the oil 
drops. The important point to note then is that all of 
Millikan’s measurements were—and still are—taken to be 
evidence for the claim that electrical charge is quantized. But, 
the measured quantities used to determine the value of e were 
all approximations due to the measurement errors inherent in 
determining the values of the relevant parameters … So, the 
evidence Millikan used to conﬁrm the claim that electric 
charge is quantized is only approximately true, due to the 
inexactness of the various methods of measurement used in 
the experiment (Shaffer 2013: 31.  See also Hilpinen 1988: 
164). 
If we suppose that the protagonists have inferential knowledge as a result of reasoning 
from a false proposition, should we say that these cases threaten E=K or J=K? 
 Let’s start with Shaffer’s criticism of E=K.  Shaffer seems to think that it’s 
obvious that Millikan’s evidence includes a falsehood, one that served as the 
evidential basis for Millikan’s inferential knowledge.  To deny this, as he sees it, is 
immensely costly:  
Adopting Williamson’s or Littlejohn’s truther view would 
then appear to commit us to the totally implausible view 
that the measurements made in such cases are not really 
evidence at all, because they are not true, and that the 
hypotheses that such measurements appear to support are 
not, in fact, confirmed on the basis of those measurements. 
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This would effectively eliminate the possibility that 
measured values ever constitute evidence in the conduct of 
the science and in our more mundane epistemic lives. So, 
adopting the truther view of evidence with respect to 
propositions that report measurements undermines the very 
possibility of conducting rational empirical inquiry 
involving measurement. But, this is clearly at odds with 
actual practice and such measurements are evidence in both 
the sciences and everyday life, often exceptionally good 
evidence (Shaffer forthcoming: 6).  
It is because Millikan’s evidence included the false proposition that the value of e was 
1.5924(17) X 1019C that Millikan was able to knowingly infer that electric charge is 
quantized.      
 Klein criticizes both J=K and E=K.  He thinks that the protagonists’ relevant 
false beliefs are justified and apparently thinks that this shows that the protagonists 
have false evidence.  In support of his claim about justificatory status, he says that this 
is ‘an instance of the general requirement that doxastic justification which depends on 
another belief requires that that belief be doxastically justified’ (2008: 50). On this 
assumption, it is thought to follow that the content of the false belief is part of the 
protagonists’ evidence because it is a consequence of his account of doxastic 
justification that the content of the false belief propositionally justifies the inferential 
beliefs that constitute knowledge (2008: 50).8 
  
2. 
While I can see why someone might describe our KFF cases in ways that would cause 
trouble for the knowledge-first approach to evidence or justification, the grounds for 
thinking that this is the best way to describe such cases strikes me as rather weak. 
 Let’s start with Millikan’s Experiment. Contrary to what Shaffer thinks, I do 
not think it is obvious that the right thing to say about Millikan’s Experiment is that 
Millikan came to know by reasoning from false evidence.  On most views of evidence, 
the proposition p will not belong to the subject’s evidence if the subject knows that p 
is false or should know that p is false.9  With this very weak constraint on evidence in 
place, it seems that Shaffer’s case is no threat.  Millikan knew, or should have known, 
that the claim that the value of e was 1.5924(17) X 1019C was nothing more than 
approximately true. If, as Shaffer suggests, something is false if it is merely 
approximately true, we should expect Millikan to have known this and known this for 
just the reasons that Shaffer cites.  As calculating the value of e required an accurate 
measure of temperature, pressure, voltage, the coefficient of viscosity of air, the 
density of clock oil, the value of the gravitational constant and the times of rise and 
fall of the oil drops, it would be mad to think that the calculated value of e was 
anything more than approximately true.  If it would be mad to believe p, I don’t think 
p is part of one’s evidence. 
                                                        
8 Arnold’s (2013) criticisms of J=K and E=K are similar. 
9 On the assumption that the subject knows p is false, it is plausible that the subject 
does not justifiably believe p. On the assumption that one should know that p is false, 
it is plausible that the subject does not justifiably believe p. Thus, if one thought that 
having a justified belief in p is necessary for having p as part of one’s evidence, the 
proposed necessary condition on having evidence should be rather plausible. 
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 To make the case plausible as a counterexample to E=K, we have to find a 
proposition that played some role in Millikan’s reasoning that has these three features:  
(a) The proposition was one that the protagonist could 
reasonably have believed;   
(b) The proposition would provide adequate support for the 
protagonist’s conclusion in that it would be reasonable for 
someone who believed the proposition to draw the relevant 
conclusion;  
(c) The proposition was not one that the protagonist knew 
because the proposition was false. 
Since the proposition that Shaffer fixes on was for Millikan either a known unknown 
or one that Millikan should have known couldn’t be known, his proposal does not 
satisfy (a).  The related proposition that the calculated value of e was 1.5924(17) X 
1019C satisfies (a) and (b), but does not satisfy (c). 
 In support of his description of the case, Shaffer writes:  
Millikan’s measurements were—and still are—taken to be 
evidence for the claim that electrical charge is quantized. 
But, the measured quantities used to determine the value 
of e were all approximations due to the measurement 
errors inherent in determining the values of the relevant 
parameters (2013: 31). 
The expression ‘Millikan’s measurements’ seems to me to be a bit of a fudge.  It 
could refer to the value that was later replaced by more careful measurements or a 
proposition about the measurements that Millikan took (e.g., that Millikan determined 
the value of e to be such and such).  Insofar as Millikan ran the experiment a number 
of times to calculate e and did not receive the same value for e in each trial, it seems 
like a rather odd psychological hypothesis to say that Millikan believed he got the 
right value and an odd normative claim to say that that’s what he ought to have 
believed. Moreover, for the purposes of the experiment, getting the precise value 
would not matter for learning that electric charge is quantized. So long as the charges 
of the observed oil drops were (roughly) whole integer multiples of e, that would 
show that electric charge is quantized rather than continuous.   
 Since Millikan’s Experiment does not satisfy (a)-(c), it seems not to be a 
terribly threatening case to E=K. And insofar as it doesn’t threaten E=K, it poses no 
obvious threat to J=K or KN.  Since, however, Father Christmas and Meeting Time do 
plausibly satisfy these three conditions, a further response is required. 
 Klein says very little in support of his contention that the protagonists’ beliefs 
in KFF cases are justified beyond saying that there is a general requirement on 
doxastic justification that doxastically justified beliefs are inferentially justified only if 
the beliefs they are based upon are themselves doxastically justified.  Thus, if he has 
an argument against E=K and J=K his argument rests on the undefended assumption 
that justification is counter-closed:  
J-Counter-Closure (JCC): Necessarily, if (i) S knows that p 
entails q and (ii) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of 
competently deducing it from p, and (iii) S knows q, then S 
justifiably believes p. 
We have to speculate a bit as to why Klein would think that JCC is true because he 
says little in support of it apart from the fact that he takes it to be an implication of a 
plausible account of doxastic justification. For my part, I would think that the 
discovery that KCC is false should lead us to reconsider the status of JCC. Shouldn’t 
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the counterexamples to KCC make us sceptical of like-from-like reasoning in general? 
Perhaps Klein thought that we had no independent grip on what it would be for a 
belief to be justified apart from a belief that could justify further beliefs. This might 
explain some of the confidence he had in JCC. To this, I have a response. The beliefs 
in the useful falsehoods do not justify further beliefs in the ways that typical justified 




Are KFF cases any threat to E=K or J=K?  Little has been said to justify the claim 
that they are.  Perhaps it’s thought that little reason is needed since we already have 
ample reason to think that beliefs in the useful falsehoods could be justified.  After 
all, isn’t there ample reason to think that there can be false, justified beliefs?  If so, 
mustn’t there be false evidence?  
 It would be disappointing if this were the only argument that critics of E=K or 
J=K could muster because then the KFF cases would not be doing much work.  If we 
were independently convinced that J=K or E=K were false, we wouldn’t care much 
about what we could learn from KFF cases in this regard.  The interesting question is 
whether KFF cases put any additional pressure on E=K or J=K.    
 It might seem that Klein has provided us with at least some reason to think 
that KFF cases present a unique challenge to E=K and J=K.  It appears that the 
standard account of the relationship between doxastic and propositional justification 
might, if combined with the idea that propositions justifiably believed are evidence 
(JE), support this counter-closure principle:  
J-Counter-Closure (JCC): Necessarily, if (i) S knows that p 
entails q and (ii) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of 
competently deducing it from p, and (iii) S knows q, then S 
justifiably believes p. 
As he sees it, doxastic justification requires propositional justification. Propositional 
justification, in turn, is either evidence or provided by the evidence. If we assume that 
the relevant beliefs are justified and accept his account of propositional and doxastic 
justification, we get some motivation for rejecting E=K:  
P1. If the protagonist comes to know q by reasoning from 
some useful falsehood p, S’s belief in q is doxastically 
justified. 
P2. The protagonist comes to know q by reasoning from 
some useful falsehood p. 
C1. Thus, the protagonist’s belief in q is doxastically 
justified. 
P3. For the protagonist’s inferential belief in q to be 
doxastically justified, the protagonist must believe q for a 
good reason. 
C2. The protagonist believes q for a good reason. 
P4. The protagonist believes q for a good reason only if the 
protagonist believes q for the reason that p and p is part of 
the protagonist’s evidence. 
C3. The protagonist believes q for the reason that p and p is 
part of the protagonist’s evidence. 
P5. If p is part of the protagonist’s evidence, the protagonist 
justifiably believes p. 
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C4. The protagonist justifiably believes p.  
If this argument establishes (C3), E=K must be false. If the argument can establish 
(C4), J=K must be false. If both are false, it looks like KN must be false, too. 
 The thought behind (P1) is that knowledge requires doxastic justification.  I’m 
happy to grant that this is so. In assuming that KFF cases are possible, we’re 
assuming (P2).  It would seem that (P3) and (P4) follow from the standard account of 
doxastic justification. The standard account says (roughly) that if the protagonist’s 
belief is doxastically justified, it is propositionally justified by virtue of the fact that 
the subject has adequate reason for having that belief and the subject believes for the 
relevant justifying reason.  The idea behind (P5) might be put this way.  If a subject’s 
evidence includes some proposition, the subject has the right to reason from that 
proposition.  If the subject ought not reason from p, the subject must not be justified 
in believing p in the first place.       
 While this argument seems initially quite promising, defenders of E=K and 
J=K have a plausible line of response.  Anyone who takes seriously the possibility 
that J=K might be true would think of proper belief or permissibly held belief as one 
that conforms to the knowledge norm. In other words, they identify knowing p with 
permissibly believing p.  In discovering that KCC is false, they would reject JCC. If 
that requires rejecting the standard account of doxastic justification, this might well 
be a price they’d be willing to pay.  They would reject (P3) on the assumption that the 
good reason that the protagonist must have for believing q is some prior reason that 
figured in reasoning because they’d deny that p is any reason at all by virtue of the 
fact that it’s false. 
 How plausible is the standard account of the relationship between 
propositional and doxastic justification? Should we say that doxastic justification is a 
matter of propositional justification plus basing and that propositional justification is 
determined by the subject's evidence? We will see that KFF cases cause trouble for 
the standard story about propositional and doxastic justification, but it is also worth 
mentioning that there are other sources of difficulty, too.  Anyone who accepts E=K 
will already have to say that the standard story has to be modified for cases of non-
inferential belief.  Consider the kinds of cases that foundationalists would use to elicit 
the intuitions that underwrite the isolation objection.  You don't know what tonight's 
dish will be but when the cloche is lifted you see that they're serving fish. Prior to this 
experience, you had no good reason to believe that it would be fish but now you 
know that it is fish.  If E=K is correct and the case is as I've described it, there was 
nothing in your possession that could have been evidence for this belief that you 
possessed independently from the belief.  If we think of propositional justification as 
(a) the whatever-it-is-that-warrants-the-formation-of-a-belief where this can be 
possessed without the relevant belief and (b) something that supervenes upon the 
evidence, we would have to reject E=K if we wanted to say that in seeing the fish and 
coming to believe there was fish for dinner you knew and justifiably believed that it 
would be fish for dinner.  If we accepted E=K, however, we would say that there is 
nothing that plays both the (a) and (b) roles. There is something that ensures that 
you're in a position to know that fish is being served and so there is something that 
ensures that you're entitled to form that belief, but that won't be evidence.  So, if 
propositional justification is understood in terms of (a), we have to reject (b). If it is 
understood in terms of (b), we have to reject (a). Since we have to give up one of 
these to understand what happens in cases of knowledge or justified belief not 
acquired by using independently held evidence, we shouldn't use the standard story 
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about propositional justification and doxastic justification in an argument against 
E=K. In using it, we're already assuming that E=K is mistaken.   
 There are two arguments that one might offer in support of the knowledge-
first views under attack.  The first argument is the ability argument.  This argument is 
designed to show that the KFF cases are not cases in which someone believes for a 
good reason because they are not cases in which the subject’s inferring q is a case of 
believing q for a reason. The second argument is the generality argument.  The 
argument is designed to show on independent grounds that the useful falsehoods 
considered thus far are not propositions justifiably believed and plausibly taken to be 
part of the protagonists’ evidence.    
 
3.1 
The ability argument requires some set up.  We often treat the subject’s evidence and 
the subject’s reasons for believing as basically interchangeable.  If Alex has evidence 
to believe that the meeting hasn’t started, he has a reason to believe that the meeting 
hasn’t started. The reason isn’t idle. It’s important to the example that Alex believes 
that the meeting hasn’t started for the relevant reason. This of course implies a 
number of things: that Alex has a certain reason, Alex exercised his capacity for 
identifying and responding to reasons in the course of forming the relevant belief, and 
that his believing what he does is a case of believing for a particular reason.  The 
reason for which Alex is said to believe that the meeting has not started is that it is 
exactly 2:58.  Note that the success of the argument against E=K and J=K turns on 
two things: 
(a) Alex believes that the meeting has not started yet for the 
reason that it is exactly 2:58;  
(b) This reason is not just the reason for which Alex 
believes that the meeting has started, it is a good reason to 
believe this, a piece of evidence that constitutes a justifying 
reason.  
If one were to deny (a) or (b), one would have to reject one of the assumptions in the 
argument against E=K or J=K because one would have to deny that doxastic 
justification requires believing for a reason that’s a good reason to so believe. 
 If Alex can reason from his belief that it is exactly 2:58 to the conclusion that 
the 7:00 meeting has not yet started, he has exercised a certain capacity to reason and 
has an ability to respond to things he believes by forming further beliefs.  Does he 
manifest the ability to believe something for the reason that it is exactly 2:58?  While 
one might think that he does if one thinks of reasons as propositions, representations, 
or propositional attitudes, this is surely not the way that a defender of E=K would 
think of it.  They would say (or should say!) that to believe for the reason that it is 
exactly 2:58 one must have the overall ability to believe for that reason where that 
reason is a fact, not (just) a proposition, representation, or propositional attitude.  
Since we’ve stipulated that the relevant proposition is false, the proponent of E=K 
will say that Alex’s belief about the meeting is not a case of believing something for 
the reason that it is exactly 2:58.  While Alex surely has a general ability to form 
beliefs in light of things he believes, he surely cannot have the opportunity to respond 
to the fact that it is 2:58 because it is not 2:58.10  Alex isn’t magic.  He cannot respond 
to facts that are not facts. 
                                                        
10 Kenny (1992) distinguishes general ability from overall ability on the grounds that 
the latter requires opportunity.  A subject retains certain general abilities (e.g., the 
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 There is a data point that critics of E=K have ignored or overlooked, one that 
has to do with the relationship between knowledge and the abilities involved in 
responding to reasons.  Upon seeing that his watch reads 2:58, let’s suppose that Alex 
comes to believe that it is 2:58, is now happy because he believes that it is 2:58, and 
walks to the bus stop rather than hailing a cab.  If asked, he might describe his 
attitudes and behaviour as follows:  
(1) Why do I believe that the meeting will not start for a 
while? Well, for the reason that it is now 2:58. As you’ll 
recall, the meeting doesn’t start until 7:00.   
(2) I am happy that it is 2:58.  That means that the meeting 
will not start for hours. 
(3) I shall take the bus for the reason that it is 2:58.  There 
is no need to hail a cab.  I have plenty of time to get to the 
office. 
We can suppose that Alex is not self-deceived.  He does not believe for reasons other 
than those he reports, does not act for reasons other than those he reports, or feel 
happy for reasons other than those he would mention.  So, taking Alex at his word, we 
can restate these in the third-person:  
(1’) Why does Alex believe that the meeting will not start 
for a while? Well, for the reason that it is now 2:58. As 
you’ll recall, the meeting doesn’t start until 7:00.   
(2’) Alex is happy that it is 2:58.    
(3’) Alex took the bus for the reason that it is 2:58.  There 
is no need for him to hail a cab because he has plenty of 
time to get to the office. 
If Alex can believe for certain reasons and these beliefs, given how Alex is otherwise, 
is sufficient for producing a certain affective response or a bit of behaviour, he should 
be able to act and feel for the very same reasons he believes.  If this is right, then the 
argument against E=K fails.  Given the details of the case, it looks like claims about 
the reasons for which Alex believes that specify his reason as the false proposition 
that it is 2:58 will be true only if (2), (2’), (3), and (3’) are true.  They are false.   
 It’s easiest to see this with the case of emotion, I think.  Is Alex happy that it is 
2:58? He cannot be happy that it is 2:58 if it is 2:56.  As Gordon (1987) and Unger 
(1975) have argued, Alex can only be happy that p, regret that p, be angry that p, etc. 
if Alex knows p.  The same holds true for acting for the reason that p.  Alex cannot 
act for the reason that p unless he knows p.  The linguistic data on this seems to be 
rather solid.  Consider:  
(2’a) Although Alex does not know that it is 2:58, he is 
happy that it is 2:58. 
(2’b)   Alex is happy that it is 2:58. Not only that, he knows 
that it is 2:58. 
It seems like (2’a) is false.  That’s some evidence that (2’) is true only if Alex knows 
that it is 2:58.  As for (2’b), it seems like a redundant conjunction. That’s some 
evidence that the information contained in the ascription of emotion contains all of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
ability to reason) when she is mistaken about the facts, but we cannot say that she has 
the overall ability to act, believe, or affectively respond to a feature of the 
circumstance if she’s wrong about the relevant features just like one cannot form 
friendships with ghosts or correctly report events that didn’t take place.   
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information contained in the knowledge ascription.  Finally, Gordon (1987) reminds 
us that (2’) seems to be equivalent to the following:  
(2’c) It is 2:58. That is why Alex is happy. 
(2’d) Alex is happy because it is 2:58. 
Clearly, these claims are true only if it is 2:58. If they are indeed equivalent to (2’) 
and (2), Alex cannot be happy that it is 2:58.   
 The same points hold true for the cases of acting and believing for reasons.  
When we try to say that someone acted or believed for the reason that p and then 
conjoin a knowledge denial, we get the same problematic results we get with (2’a).  
Of course, people realize this and quickly try to rewrite these claims so that the 
reasons for which the agent acts or believes will be a fact about the relevant 
individual’s psychology rather than the situation.  The case of emotion is helpful here 
because the psychologized redescription of the subject’s reasons come out as clearly 
false in those cases.  We would not say that Alex was happy that he believed it was 
2:58.  Alex isn’t weird, just mistaken.  Two points should be stressed here.  First, if 
we did want to say that Alex’s reason for believing or acting was that he believed it 
was 2:58, then we would have to rewrite (2’) accordingly.  Just as we know that the 
fact that Alex believes such and such is not what would make him happy, we know 
that it would not make him act or convince him that the meeting was not going to start 
for a while.  Second, Alex would presumably know these facts about his own 
psychology if there were any plausibility to the idea that he acted or believed for the 
reason that he believed something.  An argument from error against E=K requires that 
the evidence is some proposition that Alex believes that’s false.11        
 The ability argument can be summed up as follows. The KFF cases are 
counterexamples to E=K only if they are cases of believing for a reason where the 
relevant reason is a falsehood. For these cases to be cases of believing for a reason 
that’s a falsehood, one has to have the ability to believe for the relevant reason. If one 
had this ability and having the relevant belief was sufficient for producing an affective 
response or would result in the agent’s acting or forming an intention to act, the agent 
could be happy or angry that the relevant fact obtained or act for the reason that the 
fact obtains. One doesn’t have these abilities, however.  The upshot is that ‘S believes 
something for the reason that p’ entails that S knows p. While the subject might have 
the general ability to form beliefs on the basis of her belief that p when she doesn’t 
know p, she doesn’t have the overall ability to believe anything (or feel anything or 
do anything) for the reason that p because that requires the truth of p and the 
opportunity to discover it.  
 
3.2 
Recall that the success of Klein’s argument against E=K and J=K depends upon 
whether the protagonist in KFF cases believes something for a reason that’s a 
falsehood, the relevant falsehood is part of the protagonist’s evidence, and the 
relevant falsehood is evidence for the protagonist’s relevant inferential beliefs (e.g., 
Virginia’s belief that she’ll receive presents or Alex’s belief that the 7:00 meeting has 
not started).  The ability argument was supposed to show that the protagonists in the 
                                                        
11 Does that mean that Alex does not believe or act for any reason when he acts or 
believes on a false belief? Alvarez (2010) and Littlejohn (2012) say that this is the 
right way to describe the case. Alvarez helpfully distinguishes psychological 
explanations of the agent’s acts, attitudes, and emotions from reasons explanations. 
Hornsby (2007) offers a disjunctivist alternative.   
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KFF cases do not have the ability to believe something for a reason when that reason 
is a falsehood. The generality argument, which I shall discuss in this section, is an 
argument that’s supposed to show that the protagonist’s evidence does not include the 
useful falsehoods that the protagonists reason from in acquiring knowledge.  
 If we were to suppose, as the argument against E=K and J=K requires, that 
Alex and Virginia’s mistaken beliefs were justified and that the propositions 
justifiably believed to be true were part of their evidence, it seems that we would have 
to deny a plausible closure principle for justification:  
J-K-Closure (JKC): Necessarily, if (i) S knows that p 
entails q and (ii) S justifiably believes p, (iii) S can come to 
justifiably believe q on the basis of competently deducing it 
from p. 
Why is that?  It seems that there are a number of obvious consequences of Alex and 
Virginia’s beliefs that they cannot justifiably believe.  Consider the following 
inference:  
It is exactly 2:58 
If it is exactly 2:58, it is not 2:57: 58. 
Thus, it is not 2:57: 58. 
Whereas Alex knew that it was not 7:00, it seems rather intuitive that he does not 
know the conclusion of this inference. Moreover, I don’t think he should reason from 
the premise that it is exactly 2:58 to the conclusion that it is not 2:57:58 in this case.  
While he’s justified in believing that it is not 7:00, I don’t think he is justified in 
believing that it is not two seconds prior to 2:58. 
 Consider the following inference:  
Father Christmas will deliver presents. 
If Tim says otherwise, he is either lying or doesn’t know 
what he’s talking about. 
Thus, if Tim says that Father Christmas will not deliver 
presents, he is either lying or doesn’t know what he’s 
talking about. 
I don’t think that Virginia should reason in this way precisely because I’d object to 
her reasoning from the first premise to this conclusion.   
 If the relevant falsehoods really were pieces of evidence justifiably believed, 
they should serve as a proper basis for the known consequences of those propositions.  
Intuitively, however, this is not what we find. What seems rather intuitive is that these 
subjects should not rely on the relevant false premise in inferences like the ones just 
described.  What this suggests is that the intuition that these subjects have knowledge 
in Meeting Time and Father Christmas is not due to the fact that these subjects have a 
useful premise for reasoning about the world (which they don’t). As an alternative 
conjecture, the reason that we find the reasoning acceptable is precisely because we 
think of the reasoning as a possible source of knowledge. 
 Speaking just for myself, the reason that I find the intuitions that underwrite 
treating Meeting Time and Father Christmas as counterexamples to KCC is the 
thought that by reasoning from the false premise, the subject’s are reasoning 
reasonably and to a conclusion they couldn’t easily have been wrong about.  One 
reason that I think the relevant falsehoods aren’t genuine pieces of evidence is that 
they cannot justify drawing conclusions when the subject could have easily been 
wrong in drawing them.  This is what one would expect if the knowledge were 
something in the neighbourhood of a belief with a safe basis and one subscribed to a 
kind of knowledge-first approach to these matters.  Let the critics of knowledge-first 
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try their hand at explaining why it should be that an alleged piece of evidence is 
properly included in reasoning to some known logical consequences rather than others 
and I expect that they will start to see the virtues of the knowledge-first approach. 
 The generality argument can be summed up as follows. The KFF cases 
considered are not plausible counterexamples to E=K. For these cases to be 
counterexamples to E=K, the falsehoods have to be part of the protagonists’ evidence 
and generally available to them to serve as the proper basis of inference to the known 
logical consequences of these propositions.  This, however, is not what we find. 
While it seems proper for Virginia and Alex to believe some of the known logical 
consequences of the relevant falsehoods, it would also be improper for them to 
believe some of the known consequences of the relevant falsehoods. That suggests 
that their evidence does not include the relevant falsehoods.    
 
4. 
In this section, I want to discuss the broader significance of KFF cases if, indeed, the 
knowledge-first theses I’m interested in (i.e., E=K, J=K, and KN) withstand scrutiny.     
 Let me begin by offering an argument for J=K, an argument that would show 
that KCC and JCC are equivalent.  Suppose that one justifiably believed p where this 
was a case of non-inferential justification and then one infers q by means of 
competent deduction. Might one thereby come to justifiably believe q without 
knowing q? It would seem that if one subsequently forgot p, one could still justifiably 
believe q. One couldn’t then, however, believe anything for the reason that p. JKC 
says that if, in this state, one knew that r followed from q, one could justifiably infer 
r.  It seems that one can justifiably infer r only if there’s some fact that one has in 
mind that’s the reason for which one believes r. It looks like q is the natural 
candidate. It looks like q would have to be known.12 
 If we accept J=K, it looks like we should describe our KFF cases as follows:  
(a) The protagonist should not believe the premises that she 
reasons from in the course of learning that p. 
(b) The protagonist’s belief in the conclusion, p, is 
justified.   
It looks like there’s a promising argument for J=K from E=K. Assuming that one can 
justifiably believe only if one’s belief (i.e., what’s believed) is itself a reason that can 
support further beliefs, one’s belief about p is justified only if what’s believed is 
known to be true.   
 If (a) and (b) are both correct, the lesson to take from KFF cases is not that 
there is something wrong with the knowledge-first approach. The knowledge-first 
approach can explain why it is sometimes acceptable to conclude that something is so 
on the basis of a false belief and when it would be wrong to do so. It would be wrong 
to do so if the inferential belief is not safe. The intuition that it is acceptable to hold 
the belief based on the inference from a falsehood is probably due to the realization 
that the inferential belief could not easily be mistaken. 
 Now, some people might have the following intuition. Virginia, let’s say, 
shouldn’t believe that she’ll have presents for no reason at all.  Moreover, her only 
available ‘reason’ seems to be a falsehood.  If KFF cases are indeed counterexamples 
to JCC, how can we vindicate these intuitions? If, in keeping with KN, she abandons 
her belief that Santa will bring presents, shouldn’t she also abandon her belief that she 
                                                        
12  The crucial step here is the idea that evidence can be acquired via inductive 
inference. For discussion, see Bird (2004). 
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will receive presents? If she should abandon that belief, then either she doesn’t know 
that she’ll receive presents or her belief that she will receive presents is not justified in 
spite of the fact that it constitutes knowledge?  
 If, in keeping with KN, we identify permissible belief with knowledge and 
impermissible belief with belief that doesn’t constitute knowledge, we can vindicate 
these intuitions.  It is true that she should not form the inferential belief that she’ll 
receive presents without believing that Santa will bring them. If she didn’t do that, she 
wouldn’t have come to know that she’d get presents. KN says that you shouldn’t infer 
that something is so unless you’d therein come to know that it’s so.  (It’s not true that 
Virginia shouldn’t believe she’ll receive presents unless she believes that Santa will 
bring them. If she knows that she’ll receive presents and then forgets why she 
believes this, she can retain knowledge and the right to believe this.) KN vindicates 
the intuition that if she hadn’t believed Santa would bring presents, she shouldn’t 
believe she’d receive presents.       
 If KFF cases are indeed counterexamples to KCC, they would seem to show 
that a certain evidentialist view must be mistaken.  The core commitment of Conee 
and Feldman’s (2004) evidentialist approach to justification is that justified beliefs get 
that status by virtue of being supported by the subject’s evidence.  If the evidentialist 
view is combined with a factualist treatment of evidence, a view on which all 
evidence consists of facts or true propositions, it’s easy to see that this version of the 
evidentialist view is in serious trouble: 
FE: Every justified belief is justified because it is supported 
by some piece of evidence the subject has that consists of a 
true proposition that is distinct from the proposition 
believed and part of the subject’s evidence.13 
If we dispense with JCC along with KCC, there will be cases where a subject’s belief 
gets to be justified in spite of the fact that the subject doesn’t hold that belief on the 
basis of further facts that support that belief. Since FE insists that the only way that a 
justified belief gets to be justified is by virtue of being supported by a body of 
evidence that consists of facts, FE must be mistaken if there are indeed 
counterexamples to JCC. 
 Of course, the evidentialists like Conee and Feldman might not be bothered by 
this result because they don’t subscribe to FE.  They don’t (currently) think that a 
subject’s evidence consists of facts or true propositions (Conee and Feldman 2011: 
321-4).  If the evidentialists are forced to abandon FE, it seems that they must either 
embrace a view that allows for ‘false evidence’ or a view that identifies a subject’s 
evidence with something that isn’t a proposition.14   
 There are two problems with these evidentialist views.  The first problem is 
the obvious problem.  There are powerful arguments in the literature for thinking that 
some evidence, at least, consists of propositions and for thinking that all such 
                                                        
13 Cases of non-inferential justification seem to constitute a problem for this view. 
Even if FE is restricted to cases of inferential justification, the view seems to be 
problematic because there can be cases in which a false non-inferential belief is the 
sole basis for an inferential belief that appears to constitute knowledge. 
14 For defenses of ‘false evidence’ (i.e., evidence that consists of falsehoods), see 
Arnold (2013), Fantl and McGrath (2009), and Rizzieri (2011).  For arguments that 
all propositional evidence must consist of truths, see Leite (2013), Littlejohn (2011), 
and Unger (1975).  For arguments that evidence is indeed propositional, see 
Dougherty (2011) and Williamson (2000).  
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evidence must be true.  These arguments suggest that evidentialists ought to embrace 
FE rather than try to fend off objections by embracing an objectionable treatment of 
what our evidence consists in.  The second is less obvious.  Evidentialists often 
present their views as if they are intuitive or as if they provide the obviously correct 
treatment of a case.  Once we see that the evidentialist position is untenable if it is 
combined with an independently plausible account of what evidence consists in, we 
should see that the core evidentialist commitment isn’t really the truism its defenders 
often present it as being.   
 If we reject the evidentialist view, we have to reject the idea that justified 
beliefs get to be justified by virtue of the support they receive from the subject’s 
evidence. Sometimes that's why they're justified, but there's no essential connection 
between the status of being justified and the property of being supported by evidence.  
I'm not the first to question this picture. Externalists have long argued that it’s a 
mistake to try to think of all justification as being grounded in relations between 
reasons and beliefs. Here we see that there is an independent reason to take the 
externalist worries seriously.15   
 By denying JCC, I’m denying the following conditional: If one shouldn’t 
believe the premises, one shouldn’t believe the conclusion. The lesson is an anti-
evidentialist lesson that’s in keeping with knowledge-first epistemology. Pedigree 
matters only to the extent that it matters to acquiring knowledge.  When evidence is 
needed for acquiring knowledge, only knowledge will fulfil one’s needs. Sometimes 
one can come to have a safe belief by reasoning through falsehoods and thereby 
acquire knowledge. This just shows that there are normatively significant relations 
that don’t obtain by virtue of relations between beliefs and prior evidence.   
 The assumption that pedigree must matter to justification figures prominently 
in the literature on foundationalism.  In discussions of the regress argument for 
foundationalism, for example, it’s not uncommon to see the argument formulated in 
such a way that all justified beliefs either are non-inferentially justified or derive their 
justification from another justified belief.  Fumerton appeals to his principle of 
inferential justification, for example, to generate a regress argument for 
foundationalism and his principle clearly requires that any justified inferential belief 
must derive from some further justified belief that supports it (1995: 36).  If JCC is 
false, these options are not exhaustive.  Some beliefs might be justified by virtue of 
support they receive from further beliefs that are not themselves justified.  Thus, it 
looks like a common version of the regress argument for foundationalism is unsound.   
 Of course, the foundationalist might well admit that the argument is unsound 
and embrace the possibility that there are counterexamples to JCC.  If anything, the 
counterexamples to JCC might alleviate some of the pressures that the 
foundationalists have to contend with.  It is exceptionally difficult, for example, to say 
what it is about properly basic beliefs by virtue of which these beliefs to stop 
regresses.  If there are counterexamples to JCC, the power to stop a regress has to be 
distinguished from the possibility of being justified on the basis of something that 
isn’t a belief.  Thus, the critics of foundationalism cannot argue that an infinite chain 
of reasons or some web of mutually supporting belief is necessary for justification 
simply by arguing against the possibility of non-inferentially justified belief. For even 
if there is no non-inferentially justified belief in some chain of belief, the fact that 
JCC is false means that it might be possible for there to be beliefs ‘upstream’ based 
on an unjustified belief that are nevertheless justified.  There are interesting issues to 
                                                        
15 See Greco (2004), for example. 
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be explored here if, indeed, JCC is false and the standard platitudes about pedigree 
prove to be mistaken.   
 
Conclusion 
The thought that KFF cases provide us with new reasons to reject knowledge-first 
approaches to evidence, justification, or the norm of belief assume that like-from-like 
reasoning fails when it’s reasoning about knowledge but succeeds when it’s reasoning 
about justification.  This faith in like-from-like reasoning is unwarranted. Knowledge 
does beget knowledge, but it need not be begotten by knowledge. This is true for 
justification, too. 
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